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 ABSTRACT: A systematic multicriteria decision analysis technique is 
described for contractor selection and bid evaluation based on 
utility theory and which permits different types of contractor 
capabilities to be evaluated.  A UK case study is used to 
illustrate the technique.  The theoretical basis and the advantages 
of the technique are also presented. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last two decades, there has been a steady increase in the 
range of methods used for the procurement of construction work. 
 Despite this, however, there has been no commensurate 
improvement in the 'success' rate of construction projects [1]. 
 Instead, there have been extensive delays in the planned 
schedule, cost overruns, serious problems in quality and an 
increased number of claims and litigation.  To improve this 
situation, still further methods are being sought (following 
[1]) to improve current tendering procedures and contractor 
selection. 
 
The practices and procedures for selecting contractors and 
awarding contracts in the construction industry are based on 
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those used in the public sector and have remained relatively 
unchanged since the 1940's [2,3,4,5].  These involve systems of 
bid evaluation dominated by the principle of acceptance of the 
lowest price [6,7].  Many now believe that the public sector 
system of bid evaluation, concentrating as it does solely on bid 
price, is one of the major causes of project delivery problems 
[2,8,9].  Contractors, when faced with a shortage of work, are 
more likely to enter low bids simply to stay in business in the 
short term and in the hope of somehow raising additional income 
through 'claims' or cutting costs to compensate.  From a 
client's point of view, such contractors are risky.  This 
implies also that the automatic selection of the lowest bidding 
contractor is also risky - a fact that is seldom appreciated by 
construction clients.  Changing this process, however, is not 
easy.  Most clients, especially those in the public sector, 
necessarily have to be accountable for their decisions and this 
becomes more difficult when selecting bidders other than the 
lowest.  This has led researchers to look for techniques for 
contractor selection which utilise information concerning client 
objectives and contractor capabilities as well bid price as 
objectively and transparently as possible as a means of 
achieving the best value for money. 
 
Except where clients have an identified single criterion, such 
as a fixed price or fixed completion date, several criteria 
relating to contractors' likely performance (such as technical 
experience, structure of the organisation, financial stability, 
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past performance and safety records) need to be considered in 
selecting contractors.  To do this formally involves the use of 
multicriteria decision analysis methods (see eg [10] for a 
general overview of this well established technique and [11] for 
a comprehensive account of its use in the construction context). 
 These have been considered previously in contractor selection 
(eg [12,3,13,14,15,16,6,17]). 
 
In this paper we present one such method based on utility 
theory.  This is unique in the context of construction 
procurement.  The theoretical basis of the technique is 
provided.  A case study of an additive model is used to 
illustrate the technique.  This includes details of interviews 
with a number of construction professionals which elicited the 
utility functions needed.  This approach is new to the field. 
 
The proposed technique is suitable for the evaluation of bids 
where there are conflicting objectives and for sensitivity 
testing with several stake-holders [18] - a situation that 
exists in the predominant method (competitive tendering) of 
construction procurement in the UK and in all other countries 
using this method.  It may also be used in other applications, 
including: (1) the selection of construction equipment; (2) pre-
qualification of contractors, where bid price is not one of the 
criteria; and (3) the selection of construction and project 
managers. 
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CURRENT EVALUATION PRACTICES 
 
By far the most frequently used method of selecting construction 
contractors is by competitive bidding, in which the lowest 
bidder is awarded the contract.  Many countries have introduced 
modifications, involving clearly defined procedures for bid 
evaluation, to this "lowest bidder" criterion [3,4,12,19].  The 
variations in these procedures, however, still serve the common 
objective of selecting a qualified contractor on a competitive 
basis.  In Denmark, for example, the two highest and the two 
lowest tenders are excluded and the closest to the average of 
the remaining bids is selected.  A similar procedure is used in 
Italy, Portugal, Peru, and South Korea, but with only the lowest 
and highest being excluded [3].  In Saudi Arabia, the lowest 
bidder is selected provided that the bid is not less than 70% of 
the owner's cost estimate [20].  In Canada and the USA, 
especially in the public sector, the "lowest bidder" is 
selected, but a bid bond in an amount equal to 10% of the bid 
price also has to be provided [21,22].  The French practice is 
to exclude bids which appear to be abnormally low [23].  In all 
cases, bid prices are the sole basis for contractor selection 
and competition. 
 
Reliance on bid prices alone as the discriminating factor 
between bidders is, however, somewhat risky and short-sighted.  
The lowest bidder may not be the most economic choice in the 
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long term as the client runs the risk of poor performance by 
that contractor during the project life.  What is required is a 
broader evaluation technique that takes into account these risks 
when contractors are selected through an examination of other, 
non-price, data concerning the individual contractors involved 
[24].  Multicriteria methods are available for this but these 
can encounter some difficulties when comparing different 
criteria measured on different scales.  Various ways have been 
suggested to overcome these problems by combining criteria 
values into a single scale.  Hardy's [12] criterion for example 
is the bid which maximises the return on the client's 
investment.  Thus he proposes that bidders should submit a 
schedule of the payments they expect to fall due to them during 
the contract.  Both the client and contractor may use this to 
determine the Present Value of bids.  Ellis and Herbsman [8] on 
the other hand propose a time/cost approach to determine the 
winning bidder in highway construction contracts.  This involves 
applying a 'road user cost' to the contract time proposed by 
each bidder.  By this method the criteria to be considered are 
bid prices and contract time (the road user cost being applied 
to the contract time) and, by converting the contract time to a 
cost to the client, a straightforward comparison can be made on 
a single criterion.  Finally, Holt et al [13] combine what they 
term P2 scores (representing the scores of the information 
collected) and their P3 scores (representing the bid price) into 
a simple index by assigning a 40% weighting for the P2 scores 
and a 60% weighting to the P3 scores. 
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MULTIPLE OBJECTIVE DECISION MAKING 
 
Decision analysis is concerned with situations in which 
decision-makers have to choose among several alternatives A1, A2, 
..., A
n
 through the consideration of a common, but differently 
scored, set of attributes (criteria) for each alternative.  
Traditionally, the criteria scores are manipulated in such a way 
as to provide a consequence describable in terms of single 
criterion making it an easy task for the decision-maker to 
choose the most desirable alternative. 
 
Profit maximisation has long been considered to be the prime 
objective of contract bidding strategies and has been a popular 
single criterion in use.  In recent years, however, there has 
been a growing awareness that, whilst most decision-makers are 
interested in maximising profits, they are also concerned with 
other objectives such as corporate goodwill, market share, and 
future growth. 
 
Selection of a construction contractor is also a decision 
characterised by multiple objectives.  Owners want to minimise 
the likely cost of projects, but they also want contractors to 
maintain schedules as well as achieving acceptable quality 
standards. 
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Unidimensional Utility Theory 
 
Utility is a measure of desirability or satisfaction and 
provides a uniform scale to compare and/or combine tangible and 
intangible criteria [25].  A utility function is a device which 
quantifies the preferences of a decision-maker by assigning a 
numerical index to varying levels of satisfaction of a criterion 
[26].  For a single criterion (X), the utility of satisfaction 
of a consequence x' is denoted by u(x').  Utility functions are 
so constructed such that u(x') is less preferred to u(x") i.e 
u(x') < u(x"), if and only if x' is less preferred to x" i.e x' 
< x".  In other words, a utility function is a transformation of 
some level of contractor performance, xi, measured in its 
natural units into an equivalent level of decision-maker 
satisfaction, as shown in Fig 1. 
 
Theoretically, decision-makers comprise three types: risk 
averse, risk neutral, and risk prone as shown in Fig 2a, 2b, and 
2c respectively, the decision-maker's risk attitude being 
reflected in the shape of the utility curve which combines the 
decision-maker's preference attitudes, ie., increasing or 
decreasing utility with increasing xi. 
 
 
Multi-Criteria Additive Utility Function 
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All decisions involve choosing one, from several, alternatives. 
 Typically, each alternative is assessed for desirability on a 
number of scored criteria.  What connects the criteria scores 
with desirability is the utility function. 
 
The most common formulation of a multicriteria utility function 
is the additive model [18]: 
 foralli  Uw  =  U ijj
m
j
i ∑ 1 
 
where 
 
Ui is the overall utility value of alternative i  
 
uij is the utility value of the jth criterion for the ith  
alternative 
 
Uij = u(Xi), for 1≥i≥n and 1≥j≥m 
 
Xi = (xij), for 1≥i≥n and 1≥j≥m.  Xi designates a specific 
value of xij. 
 
n is the total number of criteria 
 
m is the total number of alternatives 
 
wj is the relative weight of the jth criterion 
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The advantage of an additive form is its simplicity.  In order 
to determine the overall utility function for any alternative, 
 a decision-maker need only determine n unidimensional utility 
functions for that alternative. 
 
Multicriteria utility theory generally combines the main 
advantages of simple scoring techniques and optimisation 
models.  Further, in situations in which satisfaction is 
uncertain, utility functions have the property that expected 
utility can be used as a guide to rational decision-making. 
 
To illustrate the use of multicriteria utility theory in 
contractor selection, the next section proceeds to demonstrate 
the development of an additive utility model by a hypothetical 
case study. 
 
 
HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDY 
 
A multi-storey building project is considered in which the 
owner's cost estimate is £4.5 million with a 28 week planned 
construction period.  Several potential bidders have been 
subjected to a preliminary and detailed investigation by 
examination of their files, past records with the client, 
technical referees' reports, creditor reports and site visits. 
 As a result, five contractors (A, B, C, D and E) have been 
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pre-qualified.  The five contractors' bids are shown in Table 
1.  At this point, according to the traditional approach, 
arithmetical checks would be made and the contract would be 
awarded to contractor E (£4.2 million), the lowest bidder. 
 
Now it is often argued that, as the bidders have already 
passed the preliminary screening (prequalification), they 
should all be treated as equal ('level playing-field') and 
therefore the decision of contract award should be based 
solely on the one remaining criterion ie project cost (bid 
price).  This, however, does not guarantee that the contractor 
with the lowest bid price is the best for the job.  Many 
things happen over the course of a construction contract - 
escalation, disputes, financial difficulties, etc.  It is 
quite possible that one or more of the other bidders could 
complete the project quicker, with a better standard of work 
and even cheaper at the end of the day. 
 
To establish the likelihood of this involves taking into 
account the capabilities of the bidders in addition to the bid 
price.  As the main foci of attention of any construction 
project are usually its completion time, level of quality and 
final cost, a method of comparing bidders is needed which 
takes these into account and permits the selection of the 
contractor with the best overall potential to perform and 
complete the job satisfactorily. 
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Contractor Selection Criteria (CSC) 
 
A variety of criteria has been proposed to date for contractor 
selection (eg [2,6,27,28]).  Most recently, it has been shown 
that, in addition to the bid price, there are five main 
criteria used in practice to assess the likely performance of 
contractors [29].  These comprise financial soundness, 
technical ability, management capabilities, safety 
performance, and reputation.  Each of these five criteria is 
broken down into four sub-criteria to give a total of 20 
criteria (Table 2). 
 
 
Scores of criteria 
 
There is no common method of assessing the 20 criteria in 
practice.  Most are intangible and involve some degree of 
subjective assessment.  There are some criteria, however, 
where practitioners use a common approach eg the use of ratio 
analysis for assessing the financial soundness of the 
contractor. 
 
A point score system is used here: 0-4=very poor; 5-8=poor; 9-
12=good; 13-16=very good; 17-20=excellent.  This is a similar 
system to that reported as being used by clients [31].  It is 
flexible enough to differentiate between different levels of 
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likely performance between bidders as well as allowing utility 
curves to be constructed. 
 
Some of the criteria are negatively oriented in terms of 
desirability.  An example of this is the "past failures" 
criterion.  Here, a higher score indicates that the bidder has 
many failures in previous projects.  For ease of comparison, 
and to make the scoring consistent for all criteria, the 
scores in these situations were deducted from 20.  For 
example, assume bidder A has scored 5 points indicating that 
the bidder has few past failures.  The score of the bidder A 
in this case is converted to 20 - 5 = 15.  Thus, higher scores 
consistently indicate better bidders for all criteria.  The 
only exception to this is the bid price criterion.  This is 
also negatively oriented, as lower bids are more desirable 
than higher bids, but no change is made to the values 
submitted by the bidders.  The decision-maker, therefore, has 
to be very careful when assigning values for the utility 
function in relation to this variable as lower bid prices must 
receive a higher utility values. 
 
Table 3 shows example scores for the twenty criteria for each 
bidder together with the bid prices.  The average score can be 
used to compare bidders' scores.  For example, the average 
score of 14.5 for the financial criteria for bidder A is 
calculated as follows: 
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Criterion {5}+{6}+{7}+{8} divide by four  
 
(12 + 14 + 15 + 17)/4 = 14.5 
 
Table 4 shows the average score for all five bidders together 
with their bid prices. 
 
The profile of the scores of the five bidders is shown in Fig 
3.  It can be clearly seen that bidder E has the best score 
for criterion 1 (4.2 million).  A closer look at the scores 
for the other criteria, however, indicates that bidder E is 
generally inferior to the other bidders.  This provides a 
first indication that bidder E may not be the best contractor 
for the project and also suggests the need for the other 
criteria to be taken into account. 
 
 
Assessment of relative weights 
 
To accommodate the needs of the client and the project, 
relative weights need to be assigned to the main criteria.  
This is done by first ranking the criteria in order of 
importance.  A relative weighting is then applied.  This is on 
a scale of 0 to 1 (Table 5) and is applied in such a way that 
the weights add to unity [18].  The relative weights of the 
sub-criteria are then applied using the same procedure (see 
Table 6).  The overall weights, or scaling factor, of all the 
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criteria in this case study are shown in a hierarchical 
structure in Fig 4. 
 
 
Determination of utility functions 
 
Utility functions can be developed by a technique known as 
'standard gambling'.  For the construction of the utility 
functions in this example, the decision-maker's preferences 
for gambles are analysed by the method suggested by Bell et al 
[30] and Keeney and Raiffa [18]. 
 
The first step involves the identification of the best and 
worst outcomes (criteria scores) for each one of the criteria. 
 The decision-maker is free to set these utility values at any 
level provided the best outcome has the higher value.  The 
usual method is to assign the worst outcome a utility value of 
zero and the best outcome a utility value of unity.  This 
establishes the range of utility values to be from 0 to 1 
between the worst and the best possible outcomes.  To 
determine the utility of intermediate values, the decision-
maker is offered the following options. 
 
1 Certain option: In this case the decision-maker is 
offered a certain outcome with a probability p=1. 
 
2 Risk option: In this case the decision-maker is offered a 
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probabilistic outcome in the form of a gamble, in which 
the decision-maker either receives the best outcome with 
a probability p or the worst outcome with a probability 
of 1-p. 
 
The following is an example of how the utility values for 
criterion {10} plant and equipment, with a relative weight of 
4.5% or 0.045 (see Fig 4), are obtained and from which a 
utility curve is established. 
 
Criterion {10} Plant and equipment: The scores of the five 
bidders for this criterion are shown in Table 7. 
 
The first step is to identify the best and worst outcomes for 
this criterion and assign arbitrary utility values of 1 for 
the best outcome (bidder D with 18 points) and 0 for the worst 
outcome (bidder C with 10 points) as shown in Table 8.  The 
utility of the intermediate values is then determined by 
offering the decision-maker a choice between the following 
lotteries (see Fig 5): 
 
 Lottery 1: go to route R1 for a certain consequence of 13 
points for the plant and equipment criterion 
 
 Lottery 2: go to route R2 for either a best consequence 
of 18 points (bidder D) with a probability of p or a 
worst consequence of 10 points (bidder C) with a 
  
 16
probability of 1-p. 
 
For the decision-maker to make a good decision and choose from 
the two routes, the utility value of the 13 point score must 
be assessed and compared with the expected utility of the risk 
option.  What utility value should the decision-maker assign 
to the certain outcome of the 13 points score?  To do this, 
the decision-maker determines a relative preference for a 13 
point consequence by finding the probability p for the best 
outcome (18 point score) see Fig 5, to which the decision-
maker is indifferent, between the certain route R1 for a 13 
point outcome and the gamble route R2 for the two possible 
outcomes of 18 and 10 points. 
 
Suppose, after some mental trial and error, the decision-maker 
judges the indifference probability to be p=0.5 ie 
representing indifference between a certain 13 points outcome 
and a 50-50 risk between 18 and 10 points.  This indifference 
(at p=0.5) allows the utility value of 13 points, ie U(13), to 
be found from the principal of expected values [31] and from 
the probability theory.  The expected utility from the route 
R2 of the 50-50 gamble is p x (utility of best outcome score) 
+ (1-p) x (utility of worst outcome) ie 0.5 U(18) + (1-0.5) 
U(10) = 0.5(1) + 0.5(0) = 0.5.  Since the decision-maker is 
indifferent between 13 points for certain and this gamble, the 
alternatives must have the same utility value, that is U(13) = 
0.5. 
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This procedure can be used for any scores between 10 and 18 - 
 the more utility values obtained, the better the utility 
curve appears.  Table 9 summarises the utility values obtained 
for different scores for criterion {10} plant and equipment 
and Fig 6 shows the resulting utility curve, in which the 
criteria scores are plotted against the utility values.  Once 
the utility, or preference, curve for this specific decision-
maker is constructed, the utility value for any score between 
10 and 18 points can be interpolated directly from the curve. 
 
Appendix A provides details of a real interview conducted with 
one of the four professionals involved in this case study, 
aimed at building a utility function for criterion {10} plant 
and equipment.  The 13 point score only is shown.  This 
procedure was applied for each criterion and utility values 
assigned to each criterion.  Table 10 summarises the utility 
values obtained in this way for the whole criteria set. 
 
 
Selection of the best bidder 
 
All the elements needed for the selection of the best bidder 
are now known: the list of criteria is defined; the scores of 
the bidders' achievements in these criteria have been 
assigned; the relative weights of the criteria have been 
determined; and the utility values of the decision-maker for 
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these criteria have been defined and drawn. 
 
The next step is to determine the overall utility of each 
contractor.  This is shown in Table 11 for one decision-maker 
using the additive model.  It can be clearly seen that bidder 
B has the highest utility of (0.857) and is therefore 
considered the best bidder for this project.  Table 12 shows 
the overall utility values for the five bidders by the four 
decision-makers used in this case study.  The overall utility 
values of the other decision-makers confirmed bidder B to have 
the highest overall utility value and therefore to be ranked 
first.  It should be noted that bidder E, who submitted the 
lowest bid price, is ranked only third by this method.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is a need for a contractor selection technique that is 
capable of considering multiple criteria.  Multicriteria 
utility theory provides one such approach and is especially 
useful as it allows the treatment of both quantitative and 
qualitative criteria and in situations where there are several 
stake-holders. 
 
An additive model of utility technique is chosen for its 
simplicity, practicality and appropriateness in risky choice 
situations.  The utility model uses utility curves to 
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represent the relationship between the specific capability of 
a contractor and the value of that capability in risky 
situations.  The individual importance of each contractor 
criterion is specified using a weighting which also 
incorporates the risk of the decision-maker. 
 
A hypothetical case study is described to illustrate the 
method and in which real interviews with four leading 
professionals involved in contractor selection were conducted 
for building the utility functions.  The precise assessment of 
the relative weights was shown to have a crucial bearing on 
the solution. 
 
Multicriteria utility analysis is a technique for use in 
evaluation decisions where criteria are of different 
characteristics and appears to be eminently suited to 
construction contractor selection. 
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APPENDIX A: AN INTERVIEW WITH MR OZTASH FOR BUILDING A UTILITY 
FUNCTION. 
 
The best thing to do is to start by taking any criterion and 
we see how we can build a utility function for it, let us take 
criterion number {10}. 
 
 
Utility function for the criterion {10} - Plant and equipment  
 
Let us start together by taking criterion number {10} plant 
and equipment which is a sub-criterion of the technical 
ability criterion.  The scores of the five bidders and the 
weight assigned for this criterion is shown in Table A1.  Let 
us see why we include this criterion, what each of the bidders 
has scored then we will continue building the utility function 
of your preferences. 
 
This criterion is included to verify that the equipment 
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required for the execution of the work is available at any 
time during the construction process.  The measurement of this 
criterion can be traced by the availability of construction 
equipment at any time, adequate plant and equipment to do the 
work properly and expeditiously, small tools and, the testing 
equipment. 
 
  Contractor  A  B  C  D  E 
Plant and equipment score (points)  
weight= 0.045 
 13  14  10  18  16 
 
 Table A1: Scores of the five bidders in criterion {10} 
 
The principal of utility theory states that we should assign 1 
for the best outcome and 0 for the worst outcome.  We will now 
start together building the utility function for scores 
between 10 and 18, starting at 13 points.   
 
Utility value for 13 points score.  It is better if you refer 
to the scores in Table A1 and to the Figure A1 to assist you 
in answering the following question 
 
 
 Questionnaire 
 
Q1. Since you have been told about the principal of 
utility theory, which of the contractors do you 
think should receive 1 and which of the contractors 
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do you think should receive 0 
 
Ans. Bidder D, with an 18 point score, will be assigned a 
utility value u=1.  Bidder C, with a 10 point score, 
will be assigned a utility value u=0 
 
Q2. You are offered two routes (refer to the Figure A). 
The first route is R1 and will give you an outcome 
score of 13 points for sure ie with a probability 
p=1. 
 
  The second route is R2.  Here, you either receive 
the best outcome of 18 points which has a utility 
u=1 with a probability p which is so far unknown or 
you will get the worst outcome of 10 points which 
has a utility u=0 with a probability of (1-p).  
Which route you will go for?  
 
Ans. It is difficult choice because I don’t know what is 
the probability of getting the best outcome and the 
probability of getting the worst outcome from the 
route R2. 
 
Q3. Let us assume that there is a probability of 0.3 of 
getting the best outcome and a probability of 0.7 of 
getting the worst outcome from the route R2.  Which 
route would you prefer in this case - R1 or R2 ? 
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Ans. Since P= 0.3, it seems to me that the chance of 
getting the best outcome from route R2 is very 
small, so in this case I will not gamble.  I prefer 
to choose route R1 with a 13 point certain outcome. 
  
Q4. Now let us assume that there is a probability of 0.9 
of getting the best outcome and a probability 0.1 of 
getting the worst outcome from route R2, which route 
do you now prefer? 
 
Ans. Since p = 0.9, in this case there is a high chance 
of getting the best outcome of 18 points, so I will 
gamble and choose route R2.   
 
Q5. Now let us take the probability of 0.45 of getting 
the best outcome and a probability 0.55 of getting 
the worst outcome from route R2.  Which route do you 
now prefer? 
 
Ans. I am an aversion man, but putting P= 0.45 makes the 
thing difficult to choose for me, but I believe I 
will go for the certain outcome route R1.   
 
Q6. Can you do some more of these trials and errors in 
your mind and tell me what is the value of the 
probability (P) you would assign for the best 
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outcome to make you indifferent between the two 
routes R1 and R2? 
 
Ans. I would guess that a probability of 0.5 will make me 
indifferent between the two routs R1 and R2. 
 
Q7. That is good.  According to utility theory, by 
choosing the probability that makes you indifferent 
between the two routes you have assigned a utility 
value for the certain outcome of 13 points. 
 
Ans. How can you explain to me please? 
 
Rep. In fact this what I am looking for ie I want to know the 
probability that makes you indifferent between the 
lotteries R1 and R2.  In this case I can tell you the 
utility value of your certain outcome. 
 
 It is known from the principals of probabilities that the 
expected value of any random variable in the space will 
equal the sum of probability of each variable times its 
score.  In this case the expected utility for the route 
R2 which includes two variables or two outcomes (the best 
outcome with u = 1 and the worst outcome with u = 0) will 
be: 
 0.5 X 1 + ( 1 - 0.5) x 0 = 0.5      
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 So the utility value of route R2= 0.5  Since you are 
indifferent between the two routes at a probability P = 
0.5, according to the utility theory, the two routes will 
have the same utility value.  In this case the utility 
value of R1, which represents a certain outcome of a 13 
point score, is equal to the utility of R2 which is equal 
0.5.  From this we achieve an excellent result by finding 
the U (13 points) = 0.5. 
 
Following the same procedure, the utility values for the other 
scores were obtained and these are presented in Table A2, from 
these values a utility function for the decision-maker for 
this criterion was constructed as shown in Fig A2.   
 
This procedure was then applied for every criterion, bearing 
in mind the questions are not necessarily the same for each 
criterion ie after a decision-maker become familiar with the 
principal, a straight forward probability that makes the 
decision-maker indifferent between the two routes or 
lotteries. 
 
 Contractor  A  B  C  D  E 
Plant and equipment score 
(points) 
 13  14  10  18  16 
 Utility values   0.5  0.7  0  1  0.9 
 
 Table A2: Utility values of the five bidders in criterion {10} 
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CAPTIONS 
 
Fig  Caption 
 
1  Increasing Utility function 
2  Types of decision makers 
3  Profile of the average scores for the five bidders 
A,B,C, D and E 
4  Scaling constants in a hierarchical structure 
5  Pair of lotteries for criterion {10} plant and 
equipment 
6  Utility curve for criterion {10} plant and equipment 
 
 
 
Table Caption 
 
1  Bid amounts of the five bidders 
2  Main criteria and sub-criteria for the case study 
3  Scores of the five bidders for the complete set of 
criteria 
4  Average scores of the five bidders for the main 
criteria 
5  Weights of the main criteria of the case study 
6  Relative weights of the sub-criteria for the case 
study 
7  Bidders' scores for Criterion {10} Plant and 
equipment 
8  Utility values for the best and worst outcomes for 
criterion {10} 
9  Utility values for different scores for criterion 
{10} 
10  Utility values for the five bidders as assigned by 
Mr Oztash 
11  Overall utility values for Mr Oztash 
12  Overall utility and ranking of the five bidders from 
four decision-makers 
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 Contractor  A  B  C  D  E 
 Advance payment (million £)  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.1 
 Capital bid (million £)  3.9  3.5  3.5  4  3.6 
 Routine maintenance (£m)   0.3  0.25  0.3  0.25  0.1 
 Major repairs (million £)  0.4  0.35  0.2  0.4  0.4 
 Total bid price (million £)  4.7  4.4  4.3  4.8  4.2 
 
 Table 1: Bids amounts of the five bidders 
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(1)  Bid amount (2)  Financial soundness 
Advance 
payment 
Capital 
bid 
Routine 
maintenance 
Major 
repairs 
Financial 
stability 
Credit 
rating 
Bank arrangements 
and bonding 
Financial 
status 
(3)  Technical ability (4)  Management capability 
Experience Plant and 
equipment 
Personnel Ability Past 
performance 
and quality 
Project 
management 
organisation 
Experience of 
technical 
personnel 
Managemen
t 
knowledge 
(5)  Health and safety records (6)  Reputation 
Safety Experience 
modification 
rate 
Occupational 
safety OSHA 
Manageme
nt 
safety 
accountabili
ty 
Past 
failures 
Length of 
time in 
business 
Past 
client/contractor 
relationship 
Other 
relations 
 
 Table 2: Main criteria and their sub-criteria for the case study 
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 Contractor  A  B  C  D  E 
{1} Advance payment( £m)  0.1 0.3 0.3 0.15 0.1 
{2} Capital bid (m £)    3.9 3.5 3.5 4 3.6 
{3} Routine maintenance(m£)  0.3 0.25 0.3 0.25 0.1 
{4} Major repairs (m£)  0.4 0.35 0.2 0.4 0.4 
{5} Financial stability (points)  12 11 13 10 10 
{6} Credit rating (points)  14 15 14 9 11 
{7} Bank arrangements (pts)  15 13 15 10 13 
{8} Financial status (pts)  17 17 16 11 14 
{9} Experience (points)  11 15 9 16 6 
{10} Plant and equipment  13 14 10 18 16 
{11} Personnel (points)  9 14 14 15 6 
{12} Ability (points)   11 11 15 13 6 
{13} Past performance (pts)  15 10 16 10 10 
{14} Management organisation 10 17 13 10 11 
{15} Experience of technical personnel (points) 12 16 11 9 14 
{16} Management Knowledge  15 15 14 19 15 
{17} Safety (points) 9 17 16 10 17 
{18} EMR (points) 15 8 17 6 20 
{19} OSHA (points) 8 13 9 10 16 
{20} Management safety accountability (points) 7 11 12 8 11 
{21} Past failures (points) 15 16 11 10 11 
{22} Length of time in business 14 15 14 11 6 
{23} Client/contractors relationship (points) 10 13 14 10 10 
{24} Other relationships 9 12 17 9 13 
 
Table 3: Scores of the five bidders for the complete set of criteria 
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 Contractor  A  B  C  D  E 
(1) Bid amount (Million £)  4.7  4.4  4.3  4.8  4.2 
(2) Financial capacity   14.5  14.5  14.5  10  12 
(3) Technical ability   11  12  12  15.5  8.5 
(4) Managerial capability   13  13.5  13.5  12  12.5 
(5) Health and safety   10  13  13  8.5  16 
(6) Reputation (Points)  12  14  14  10  10 
 
 Table 4: Average scores of the five bidders for the main criteria 
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Criteria  Bid 
 amount 
 Financial 
 soundness 
 Technical 
 ability 
 Management 
 capability 
Health and 
 safety 
 
 Reputation 
 Weight  0.55  0.15  0.1  0.1  0.05  0.05 
 
 Table 5: Weights of the main criteria of the case study 
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(1)  Bid amount (0.55) (2)  Financial soundness (0.15) 
Advance 
payment 
Capital bid Routine 
maintenance 
Major 
repairs 
Financial 
stability 
Credit 
rating 
Bank 
arrangemen
ts and 
bonding 
Financial 
status 
 .05  .75  .1  .1  .3  .2  .15  .35 
(3)  Technical ability (0.1) (4)  Management capability (0.1) 
Experience Plant and 
equipment 
Personnel Ability Past 
performance 
and quality 
Project 
managemen
t 
organisation 
Experience 
of technical 
personnel 
Mngement 
knoledge 
 .2  .45  .3  .05  .4  .2  .2  .2 
(5)  Safety record (0.05) (6)  Reputation (0.05) 
Safety Experience 
modification 
rate 
Occupational 
safety OSHA 
Managemen
t safety 
accountabilit
y 
Past 
failures 
Length of 
time in 
business 
Past 
client/contrctor 
relationship 
Other 
relations 
 .2  .3  .3  .2  .3  .1  .4  .2 
 
 Table 6: Relative weights of subcriteria for the case study 
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 Contractor  A  B  C  D  E 
Plant and equipment scores  (points)  13  14  10  18  16 
 
 Table 7: Bidders' scores for Criterion {10} Plant and equipment 
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 Contractor  D  C 
 Plant and equipment score (points)  18  10 
 Utility value  1  0 
 
Table 8: Utility values for the best and worst outcomes for the criterion {10} 
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 Contractor  A  B  C  D  E 
Score (points)  13  14  10  18  16 
Utility value  0.5  0.7  0  1  0.9 
 
Table 9: Utility values for different scores for criterion {10} 
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 Contractor  A  B  C  D  E 
{1}.  Advance payment   1  0  0  0.8  1 
{2}.  Capital bid     0.55  1  1  0  0.85 
{3}.  Routine maintenance   0  0.85  0  0.85  1 
{4}.  Major repairs    0  0.8  1  0  0 
{5}.  Financial stability    0.9  0.85  1  0  0 
{6}.  Credit rating     0.95  1  0.95  0  0.70 
{7}.  Bank arrangements   1  0.85  1  0  0.85 
{8}.  Financial status    1  1  0.95  0  0.55 
{9}.  Experience     0.85  0.95  0.6  1  0 
{10}.  Plant and equipment   0.5  0.7  0  1  0.9 
{11}.  Personnel    0.7  0.95  0.95  1  0 
{12}.  Ability     0.85  0.85  1  0.95  0 
{13}.  Past performance   0.95  0  1  0  0 
{14}.  Management organisation  0  1  0.85  0  0.7 
{15}.  Experience of technical personnel   0.80  1  0.70  0  0.90 
{16}.  Management Knowledge  0.5  0.5  0  1  0.5 
{17}.  Safety   0  1  0.95  0.5  1 
{18}.  EMR   0.85  0.4  0.95  0  1 
{19}.  OSHA  0  0.7  0.5  0.6  1 
{20}.  Management safety accountability   0  0.90  1  0.5  0.90 
{21}.  Past failures   0.90  1  0.50  0  0.5 
{22}.  Length of time in business  0.95  1  0.95  0.75  0 
{23}.  Past client/contractors relationship   0  0.90  1  0  0 
{24}.  Other relationships  0  0.70  1  0  0.75 
 
 Table 10: Utility values for the five bidders as assigned by Mr Oztash 
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 Contractor  A  B  C  D  E 
{1}.  Advance payment  1 x 0.0275 0 x 0.0275 0 x 0.0275 0.8x0.0275 1 x 0.0275 
{2}.  Capital bid    0.55x 0.4125 1 x 0.4125 1 x 0.4125 0 x 0.4125 0.85 x 0.4125 
{3}.  Routine maintenance  0 x 0.055 0.85 x 0.055 0 x 0.055 .85x 0.055 1 x 0.055 
{4}.  Major repairs   0 x 0.055 0.8 x 0.055 1 x 0.055 0 x 0.055 0 x 0.055 
{5}.  Financial stability   0.9 x 0.045 0.85 x 0.045 1 x 0.045 0 x 0.045 0 x 0.045 
{6}.  Credit rating    0.95 x 0.03 1 x 0.03 0.95x 0.03 0 x 0.03 0.7 x 0.03 
{7}.  Bank arrangements  1 x 0.0225 0.85x 0.0225 1 x 0.0225 0 x 0.0225 0.85 x 0.0225 
{8}.  Financial status  1 x 0.0525 1 x 0.0525 .95x 0.0525 0 x 0.0525 0.55 x 0.0525 
{9}.  Experience    0.85 x 0.02 0.95 x 0.02 0.6 x 0.02 1 x 0.02 0 x 0.02 
{10}.  Plant and equipment 0.5 x 0.045 0.7 x 0.045 0 x 0.045 1 x 0.045 0.9 x 0.045 
{11}.  Personnel   0.7 x 0.03 0.95 x 0.03 0.95 x 0.03 1 x 0.03 0 x 0.03 
{12}.  Ability    0.85 x 0.005 0.85 x 0.005 1 x 0.005 0.95x 0.005 0 x 0.005 
{13}.  Past performance   0.95 x 0.04 0 x 0.04 1 x 0.04 0 x 0.04 0 x 0.04 
{14}.  Mngmnt organisation 0 x 0.02 1 x 0.02 0.85 x 0.02 0 x 0.02 0.7 x 0.02 
{15}.  Experience of technical personnel  0.8 x 0.02 1 x 0.02 0.7 x 0.02 0 x 0.02 0.90 x 0.02 
{16}.  Management Knowledge 0.5 x 0.02 0.5 x 0.02 0 x 0.02 1 x 0.02 0.5 x 0.02 
{17}.  Safety  0 x 0.01 1 x 0.01 0.95 x 0.01 0.5 x 0.01 1 x 0.01 
{18}.  EMR  0.85 x 0.015 0.4 x 0.015 0.95x 0.015 0 x 0.015 1 x 0.015 
{19}.  OSHA 0 x 0.015 0.7 x 0.015 0.5 x 0.015 0.6 x 0.015 1 x 0.015 
{20}.  Management safety accountability  0 x 0.01 0.90 x 0.01 1 x 0.01 0.5 x 0.01 0.9 x 0.01 
{21}.  Past failures  0.9 x 0.015 1 x 0.015 0.5 x 0.015 0 x 0.015 0.5 x 0.015 
{22}.  Length of time in business 0.95 x 0.005 1 x 0.005 0.95x 0.005 0.75x 0.005 0 x 0.005 
{23}.  Client/contractors relationship 0 x 0.02 0.9 x 0.02 1 x 0.02 0 x 0.02 0 x 0.02 
{24}.  Other relationships 0 x 0.01 0.70 x 0.01 1 x 0.01 0 x 0.01 0.75 x 0.01 
 OVERALL UTILITY  0.558  0.857  0.814  0.211  0.648 
 
 Table 11: Overall utility values for Mr Oztash 
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Interviewee Contractor  A  B  C  D  E 
 Oztash  0.558  0.857  0.814  0.211  0.648 
 Ahmet  0.522  0.815  0.783  0.191  0.633 
 Hussin  0.516  0.792  0.792  0.177  0.673 
 Kamalain  0.511  0.761  0.758  0.175  0.653 
 Rank order  4  1  2  5  3 
 
Table 12: Overall utility and ranking of the five bidders from four decision makers 
